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1The Scales of Justice:  Federal-Local Tensions in the War on 
Terror
Kris Erickson, John Carr, and Steve Herbert1
Recently, the city of Portland, Oregon, found itself willing to just say no to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  After eight years of participation 
with the FBI in a joint task force to investigate residents suspected of plotting 
terrorist acts, the city decided to withdraw.  The task force was an example of a 
federal-local law enforcement partnership that is now quite common in the 
United States, especially in the age of heightened concern about terrorism.  
Such partnerships bring together the investigatory expertise of federal agencies 
with the local knowledge of city or county law enforcement.  
The decision to withdraw was the focus of much local controversy, and 
followed a protracted and impassioned public debate.  Portland officials cited 
two main reasons for ending its cooperation with the FBI.  The first involved 
strong suspicions from the city’s Muslim community that they were being 
illegitimately targeted in investigations of alleged terrorist activity.  Secondly, 
there was a concern that local officials were not sufficiently able to oversee the 
work the Portland police were doing in conjunction with the FBI.   The FBI, 
citing the sensitivity of their investigations, did not want elected officials, 
including the mayor, to have access to their files.  City officials thus felt 
prevented from assuming their responsibility to oversee the practices of law 
enforcement.  
In an age in which the “war on terror” appears both unremitting and 
unwinnable, such conflicts between federal and local law enforcement agencies 
may become commonplace (see Thacher, 2005, for an analysis of similar 
dynamics in Dearborn, Michigan).  But these conflicts are hardly new.  Instead, 
they reflect long-standing tensions within American political culture over the 
proper balance of political power between central and local authorities.  There 
remain persistent conflicts over the geographic scale – national, regional, state 
or local – of governance. These struggles are typically most ardent when actors 
at one scale seek an expansion of power that might reduce the power of actors 
at other scales.   
These political tensions over the geographic scale of authority have a long 
pedigree; they have appeared in a range of policy arenas throughout American 
history.  Most famously, perhaps, they were a central component of the 
struggle for the expansion of civil rights for African-Americans; federal efforts 
to enhance equal opportunity were met with resistance couched in the language 
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2of local control and states’ rights.  These tensions over the scale of governance 
also emerge, understandably, in the area of law enforcement, where the 
coercive power of governmental authorities is at its most evident.   As the 
Portland story illustrates, strong political passions can emerge in contests over 
where to situate the power to investigate suspected criminals and to bring them 
into the criminal justice process.  
In this chapter, we hope to show that what may appear, in the Portland 
case, as a new story about the politics of fighting terror is in fact a much older 
one about the scales of justice.  This timeworn story about the balance of 
power between different geographical scales often focuses upon law 
enforcement practice, but it is hardly limited to that policy arena.  In 
elaborating our argument, we reinforce the work of numerous scholars who 
recognize the significance of geographic scale.  Their central insight is a simple 
but often neglected one: that the scalar location of social phenomena is critical 
to understanding how those phenomena operate (see, for starters, Brenner, 
2001; Cox, 1993; Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Marston, 2000; McMaster and 
Sheppard, 2002).  The significance of geographic scale is nowhere more 
evident than in discussions of political authority.  Political actors and 
institutions with a global reach, for example, exert a  different power from that 
of entities having a  more limited scope.  In short, to understand the extent and 
capacity of political power, one must understand the geographic scale at which
it operates.
We seek to reinforce this line of work, but to focus attention more 
particularly on the ideology of scale, on the discursive political significance of 
situating practices at one jurisdictional level versus another.  The ideological 
power of scale is especially obvious in the robust debates about where to locate 
the surveillance and arrest powers of law enforcement authorities.i  As we will 
show, strong arguments can be made for situating this power at both federal 
and local levels.  Because of the significance of the coercive capacity of law 
enforcement agents, political debates that rehash these arguments in the context 
of policing can be vigorous, as they were in Portland.
It is no great surprise that ideological struggles over the geographic scale 
of political authority are longstanding and impassioned in the United States.  
Such debates date to the formation of the republic.  Certainly, the authors of 
the U.S. Constitution wrestled ardently with competing claims for federal and 
state governmental dominance; they sought to balance the need for centralized 
authority against the desire for an autonomous sphere for state governments.  
Such a balance is ever elusive, because the alignment of interests favoring 
more expansive federal or state power continually shifts depending on the 
issues and context.  A political progressive, for instance, may favor centralized 
authority to reduce poverty but fear its exercise in acts of surveillance.  A 
conservative, by contrast, may see things completely differently, favoring a 
hands-off approach on economic issues but a stronger hand on matters cultural 
and criminal.  
3In sum, there is an ongoing and contentious politics around the scale of 
governance.  We use the war on terror, and the story of Portland, to illustrate 
the potency and indeterminacy of the political struggles over scale.  We move 
through five sections.  In the first, we review the history of federalism in the 
United States, noting the ongoing struggle over where to situate political 
authority.  We consider, second, the specific case of crime control, and review 
those forces that grant increased—though never complete--legitimacy to more 
centralized law enforcement efforts.   In our third section, we focus on the War 
on Terror and the federal response to it, most notably in the form of the USA 
Patriot Act.  We follow this with an analysis of the political contest in Portland.  
A concluding section summarizes and extends our analysis.  
U.S. Federalism and the Constitutionally Embodied Struggle Over Scale of 
Governance
Questions of federalism have often become imbricated in such 
contemporary hot-button political debates as abortion, gay marriage, and 
medical marijuana.  Yet the potential of scale of governance to become a focus 
for political debate is effectively enshrined within the U.S. Constitution.  From 
the beginning, irreconcilable currents of distrust of both local and centralized 
decision-making have animated the form of the Constitution and subsequent 
interpretive case law.  Thus, current political debates over the scale of 
governance, as witnessed in Portland, invoke and repeat the framers’ original 
conflicting views about how to strike the right balance of power between 
central and local political authorities (Blomley, 1994, at 116-120), the barest 
outlines of which we sketch here.
In concrete terms, this institutionalized tension finds its most obvious and 
influential manifestation in the U.S. Constitution.  On its face, Article VI, 
Clause 2 – known as the “supremacy clause” –  establishes the preeminence of 
the Federal government and federal law, providing that:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”ii
This centralized authority was subsequently reinforced by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which likewise limits the powers of the states to transgress 
individual rights under the Federal Constitution:
4“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”iii
Such powerful assertions of the authority of a strong central government are 
offset by language in both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, each of which 
carves out an equally robust state and local governmental sphere.  Under the 
Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people,”iv thus promising effectively unrestrained local 
governmental authority over those matters not explicitly addressed by the 
Federal Constitution.  In a similar vein, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment
exempt the states from suit in  the Federal courts under certain circumstances, 
providing that, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
Foreign State.”v
While the constitutional division of power between local and national 
scales of governance is fairly straightforward in theory – all power to the states 
except where authority has been explicitly granted to the federal government 
by the constitution – in practice it becomes both ambiguous and historically 
fluid.  Indeed, because of the susceptibility of the constitutional grants of 
federal authority to widely varying interpretationvi, the federalist scheme 
embodied by the constitution has created a state of permanent struggle between 
scales of governmental authority.
Indeed, the question of scale of sovereignty was seen as so essential to the 
survival of the young republic that it animated the creation of party politics in 
the United States; Hamilton’s Federalist Party advanced the cause of a strong 
central government, Jefferson’s Democrat-Republican Party the need for state 
and local authority.  It was within the courts, however, that much of the 
struggle between scales of governance has played out.  Notwithstanding 
Jefferson’s victory in the 1800 election, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1819 ruling 
in McCulloch v. Marylandvii solidified the trend towards consolidation of 
centralized governmental authority by upholding the Federal authority to 
establish a national bank,   In a move that foreshadowed subsequent judicial 
expansions of federal Power, the McCulloch court based its decision upon the 
enumerated Constitutional grant of federal powers of taxation, borrowing, and 
regulation of interstate commerce along with  Article I, Section 8, Clause 
18permitting the national government to, “make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”viii
5While the Supreme Court’s early decisions set the stage for an expansion 
of new federal powers, a series of National crises and initiatives –the Civil War 
and the Depression, Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” effort to eradicate 
poverty and promote civil rights, and most recently the “War on Terror,” –
have given impetus to such an expansion.  Along with the defeat of the South 
in the Civil War and the invalidation of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment, 
a further shift of governmental power from the local to the national scale 
developed.  Specifically, the post-Civil War period saw both the invalidation of 
state laws regulating commercial activities such as railroadsix under notions of 
federal commerce clause preemption, as well as the creation of the first 
substantial Federal regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.  Shortly after the turn of the 20th century, the judiciary began 
interpreting  the commerce clause as validating the extension of federal 
authority to almost all economic activity in the “stream of commerce.”x   Such 
judicial involvement in the balance of power between governmental scales was 
essential to the consolidation of federal power, and the birth of the modern 
centralized regulatory state.  
The pull toward the expansion of federal power under the commerce 
clause grew stronger in years following the Great Depression and World War 
II.  Notwithstanding substantial initial  resistance to Roosevelt’s “New Deal” 
efforts to respond to the worldwide economic depression, the Court’s decisions 
in the late 1930’s xi effectively opened the door to unlimited federal economic 
regulation, enabling the federal government to exert a virtually 
unchallengeable dominance over an increasingly broad range of economic 
activities.
Following the pattern set by both post-Civil War federal programs and the 
New Deal, a strong centralized national government continued to be regarded 
as the primary tool for enacting sweeping political change in the name of social 
justice, and overcoming what were perceived to be parochial, and often 
discriminatory, local practices.  This tendency was most strongly manifested 
by the Federal government’s championing of the cause of civil rights in the 
1950’s and 60’s. Thus, Brown v. Board of Education,xii --which extended the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protections to the racial composition of state 
classrooms -- and Johnson’s Great Society project – which led to passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as a host of  environmental regulations, 
and an increasingly intertwined system of federal grants to all scales of local 
government conditioned upon local compliance with an increasingly large 
number of federal requirements – all typified a judicial move towards larger 
and larger scales of governmental authority.
While much of the historical jurisprudence interpreting the 
constitutional tensions between scales of governance has – as outlined above –
favored a centralized federal government, this trend has been resisted by a 
countercurrent favoring state and local authority.  For example, before the 
eruption of federal authority over civil rights in the 1950’s and 60’s the Court 
had previously deferred to Southern states’ “Jim Crow” laws and practices.  
6Thus as early as the 1890’s the Court upheld a state statute requiring railways 
to provide equal but separate accommodations for white and “colored” 
passengersxiii, as well as  racial segregation in public education as ‘a matter 
belonging to the respective states.’” xiv  
Similarly, the modern Rheinquist Court has begun to reassert the 
fundamental importance of state governmental authority in a number of 
landmark cases putting a check on the continued expansion of federal 
authority.  In particular, the Supreme Court has begun to limit Congress’ 
previously unbounded Commerce Clause powersxv, while recognizing States’ 
Tenth Amendment immunity from federal mandates for state adoption and/or 
participation in federal regulatory programs. xvi
It is important to stress that the efforts to increase federal power, often in 
the name of progressive social change, have been consistently resisted both in 
the political arena and in the courts  through traditional arguments for the 
virtues and necessity of governance at local and state scales.  Southern 
resistance to federal civil rights programs and court-ordered integration provide 
the prime example of this trend.  In this instance, arguments for racial 
segregation were re-articulated as more facially neutral assertions of state 
rights and inherent local sovereignty. Since the 1950’s, similar rhetoric in favor 
of “state’s rights” and “small government federalism” have been mobilized in 
efforts to oppose a host of federally recognized rights, entitlements, and social 
programs – as in the case of abortion rights and affirmative action, and to 
attempt to preempt the creation of such rights, entitlements, and programs – as 
in the case of gay marriage. 
Yet it would be a mistake to make a simple equation between progressive 
policy and increased federal power, or between reactionary politics and local 
power.  Certainly, local activism is often progressive in its approach (see 
Andrea McArdle, Chapter   in this volume), and skeptical of federal authority.   
Similarly, as is witnessed in contemporary debates over gay marriage, 
conservative groups often seek strong assertions of centralized power to limit 
local autonomy.  These concurrent, contradictory developments belie the 
presumption, often operative in U.S. politics, that centralized federal authority 
is the tool of progressive, often left-leaning social and economic agenda, and 
that the assertion of states’ rights and the need for localized scales of 
government largely serve as tropes for conservative opponents of such agenda.  
These contradictory currents illustrate our central claim: that the ideologies of 
scale are simultaneously potent and fluid.  Advocates of certain policy 
positions often legitimate those positions by associating them with a particular 
scale of governance, be it centralized or de-centralized.   But their allegiance to 
that scale may be fleeting; in other instances, those same advocates may 
champion the benefits of situating authority at an alternate scale.  
This is what played out in Portland, a politically progressive city that 
found itself resisting federal interventions in law enforcement.  To understand 
that dynamic, we need first to understand the scale politics of law enforcement.
7Federalism and Crime Control
The boundary between federal and local control is often an ill-defined and 
contentious one; it can be a political fault line riddled with fissures and 
dislocations.  In short, those who favor localized control both fear centralized 
power and trumpet notions of organic, bottom-up politics.  The danger of 
federal power is that it will go unchecked, and enable central authorities to pry 
too deeply into, and regulate too completely, the affairs of the citizenry 
(Fogelson. 1971; Marx, 1990).  The romance of local control is bound up with 
its association with the citizen-subject, who is close to the dynamics that most 
directly shape his or her life, and who should possess the capacity to shape 
those dynamics through localized political action (see Bryan, 2003).  
On the other hand, centralized power can accomplish worthy social goals.  
As noted above, the federal government has stepped in to guarantee civil 
liberties where local authorities refuse to protect them.  It also often seeks to 
provide oversight and direction to large-scale problems of governance.  
Certainly, efforts to reduce poverty are more likely to succeed if developed on 
a national scale, given the macroeconomic dynamics that generate income 
patterns.  Isolated efforts by localities will hardly alter those patterns much, if 
at all (Massey, 1979).
These tensions are especially evident in debates over the proper control of 
law enforcement.  The police power is, by tradition, a hallowed local power in 
the United States.  As Sandra O’Connor argued in a recent dissent in a key 
federalism case, Gonzales v. Raich,xvii, “[t]he States’ core police powers have 
always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of their citizens.”xviii  This guarantee of localized control 
over law enforcement stems, in large part, from suspicions of centralized 
power that animated the protections in the Bill of Rights against government 
authority. Because the abuse of such authority is often embodied as the prying 
federal law enforcement agent, key provisions of the Bill of Rights, including 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, were written precisely to keep the 
inquisitive eyes of the central government from any unjustified surveillance.
The favored status of localized policing means that there are an abundance 
of law enforcement agencies in the United States.  Geller and Morris (1990) 
document that  the United States has nearly 12,000 municipal, 79 county, and 
more than 18,000 township police agencies; more than 3,000 county sheriff’s 
departments; 51 state police and highway patrols; and nearly 1,000 nonfederal 
special-purpose police agencies.  Given this sprawling law enforcement 
apparatus, and the resultant potential for duplication, lack of communication, 
and interjurisdictional disputes, it is not surprising that federal agents tout the 
efficiency that results from more centralized, and hence coordinated, crime 
reduction efforts.  
8These efforts to centralize law enforcement practices have historically run 
in tandem with the wider efforts to assert federal control.   The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) was created coterminously with the New Deal, and was 
meant to target organized and other forms of trans-state crime (Powers, 1987; 
Theoharis, et. al., 1999).  In these efforts, the FBI sought to create partnerships 
with local law enforcement, in no small part through developing centralized 
databases to collate crime patterns and various key pieces of information, such 
as fingerprints.  In the Great Society era, federal commissions sought to 
understand crime and law enforcement patterns, especially because these were 
seen as central dynamics fueling many instances of urban unrest (Kerner 
Commission, 1968; McCone Commission, 1965).  Out of these commissions 
emerged centralized efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
policing.  The primary example here was the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Association (LEAA), which subsequently metamorphosed into the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ).  
These agencies have sought to influence local law enforcement by 
charting “best practices” and providing resources for departments to adopt 
these practices (Ross, 2000).  Reforms such as community policing and 
problem-solving policing were spurred in large part by these agencies.  Local 
law enforcement agencies were thus provided incentives to adopt these 
reforms, because they could lead to an infusion of resources (Giblin, 2004; 
Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Herbert, 2005).  More directly, federal law 
enforcement agencies seek to influence local law enforcement through various 
joint efforts to combat crimes having trans-local dynamics, such as drug 
trafficking.  Local police departments often recognize incentives to participate 
in such task forces; they can gain training, expertise, and status.  At the same 
time, they are sometimes wary of collaboration.  Federal agents might usurp 
local authority or claim excessive credit for any successes that might result.  
These outside agents might also disrupt relations local police have developed 
with informants or members of marginal communities, such as undocumented 
immigrants.  Local police may wish not to arrest people who are technically in 
violation of federal law in order to protect key sources of information they 
have cultivated over a long period of time.  These delicate relations can 
possibly be damaged by heavy-handed federal law enforcement officers who 
seek quick and well-publicized arrests.
In short, any hope for identifying bright lines that clearly demarcate where 
federal police power should end and local police power should begin remains 
elusive.  Geller and Norris (1990, 233) summarize the situation well: “The 
justification usually offered for the hodgepodge of American police forces is 
that freedom, and a healthy system of checks and balances arising out of 
interagency competition, precludes the creation of a national police force.  This 
is a deeply, one might say passionately, held belief, and it is for the time being 
politically unassailable.” 
9Yet this belief is politically assailed, in no small part because of the 
increased prominence of crime as an issue in national politics.  This dates most 
significantly to the 1960’s, when Republican presidential candidates Barry 
Goldwater (1964) and Richard Nixon (1968) employed the so-called “Southern 
strategy” to lure conservative whites from their traditional alliance with the 
Democratic Party.  Key to this strategy was the linking of civil rights activism 
with criminality; the protests of activists were characterized as synonymous 
with a breakdown in “law and order” (see Beckett, 1997). More generally, the 
law-and-order political discourse that emerged remained a viable vote-getting 
strategy in the subsequent years, and fueled the massive fourfold increase in 
incarceration in the United States (Parenti, 1999; Wacquant, 2001).  Given the 
political prominence of the desire to fight a “war” on crime, federal-level 
politicians sought to toughen criminal laws and expand federal intervention 
into criminal investigations.
From this position, it is a short step to a federalized emphasis on fighting a 
new war, this one on terrorism, despite the continuing importance of local 
policing institutionally and ideologically.  Not surprisingly, the federal-local 
fault line has once again been disturbed by efforts to combat terrorism, most 
notably in the form of the USA Patriot Act.
Federalism and Crime Control under the “War on Terror.”
The “war on terror” generally, and such specific measures as the Patriot 
Act (“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”) may represent a substantial 
break with a number of traditional doctrines of U.S. criminal law.  Yet they 
should also be understood as the most recent chapter in the continuing 
American struggle over the scale at which crime control is governed, as well as 
a continuation of the trend toward consolidating and nationalizing authority 
over crime control.  
From its inception, the Federal Government has framed the “war on 
terror” as both a multi-scalar conflict requiring police efforts ranging from the 
local to the international, as well as a conflict that must inherently be managed 
by a strong central authority. Almost two months after the September 11 
attacks, President Bush posited the “war on terror” as more than an effort “to 
defend our homeland,” but rather as “a war to save civilization.”(Bush, 2001).  
Even given the international scale of such a project, Bush was careful to 
articulate the War on Terror as inherently a local effort, but one that required a 
strong, supervisory federal government: “To coordinate our efforts we've 
created the new Office of Homeland Security.  Its director. . .reports directly to 
me -- and works with all our federal agencies, state and local governments, and 
the private sector on a national strategy to strengthen our homeland 
protections” (Bush, 2001). In the context of airport security, Bush explicitly 
framed safety as directly correlated to federal oversight of local law 
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enforcement:  “We have posted the National Guard in America's airports and 
placed undercover air marshals on many flights.  I call on Congress to quickly 
send me legislation that makes cockpits more secure, baggage screening more 
thorough, and puts the federal government in charge of all airport screening 
and security” (Bush, 2001). 
Moreover, like prior efforts in the “war on crime,” the federal government 
has backed up strong rhetoric regarding the need for centralized leadership 
with substantial regulatory and economic incentives and initiatives.  
Specifically, the Patriot Act calls for the intensification of federal involvement 
with, oversight of, and participation from a variety of state and local 
governmental agencies.  For example, Section 215 of the Patriot Act permits 
the federal government to obtain a court order mandating the production of any 
documents or other information held by any organization – including state 
agencies and libraries – solely upon the unsupported assertion by an FBI agent 
that such information is “for an authorized investigation . . . to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”xix The 
implications of Section 215 for local government are particularly powerful 
given that, as of October 2002, a survey conducted by the University of Illinois 
reported that, “Federal and local law enforcement officials, visited at least 545 
(10.7%) libraries to ask for records pursuant to Section 215. Of these, 178 
libraries (3.5%) received visits from the FBI” (Estabrook, 2002).  Because 
Section 215 makes it illegal for an individual or organization approached by 
the FBI to report that records were requested, the numbers reported by 
Estabrook almost certainly have underreported FBI efforts to obtain 
information from such local governmental entities as libraries.xx
That said, perhaps the greatest potential implication of local authority in 
the federal prosecution of the “war on terror” is through various programs 
providing for local/federal crime control partnerships.  For example, Section 
701 of the Patriot Act authorizes the Federal Office of Justice Programs to 
“make grants and enter into contracts with state and local law enforcement 
agencies and with nonprofit organizations to identify and combat multi-
jurisdictional criminal conspiracies.”xxi Likewise, Section 816 enables the
United States Attorney General to establish a variety of “regional computer 
forensic laboratories,” for the purpose of providing training and assistance to 
“Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel,” in the investigation and
prosecution of local and Federal computer crimes, as well as to “facilitate and 
promote the sharing of Federal law enforcement expertise and information 
about the investigation, analysis, and prosecution of computer-related crime 
with State and local law enforcement personnel.”xxii Section 908 provides for 
the Federal Attorney General and CIA to provide local and state officials 
training in the identification and use of “foreign intelligence information.”xxiii
The Patriot Act even goes so far as to empower the federal government to 
contract with local law-enforcement for the protection of military bases during 
the duration of the Iraq war, with the Department of Defense footing the 
bill.xxiv
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Beyond the specific terms of the Patriot Act, the “War on Terror” has also 
brought a redoubled effort to create and maintain “Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces” (JTTF). Described by the FBI as “teams of state and local law 
enforcement officers, FBI Agents, and other federal agents and personnel who 
work shoulder-to-shoulder to investigate and prevent acts of terrorism,” such 
JTTFs were first created in the 1980s (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005).  
While such partnerships expanded slowly in the 1990s in response to the 
World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, the “war on terror” has 
spurred a resurgence in the creation of JTTFs (Dreyfuss, 2002).
The incentives for local law enforcement agencies to participate in the 
“war on terror” are potentially quite substantial.  For example, $50 million and 
$100 million were allocated for local contracts to “identify and combat multi-
jurisdictional criminal conspiracies,” under Section 701 during fiscal years 
2002 and 2003 respectively (Doyle, 2001).  Likewise, Section 1005 provides 
$25 million per year until 2007 for grants from the Attorney General to “States 
and units of local government to improve the ability of State and local law 
enforcement, fire department and first responders to respond to and prevent 
acts of terrorism,” (Doyle, 2001).xxv Effectively writing a blank check for local 
terrorist response readiness projects, Section 1013 provides for “appropriations 
in whatever sums are necessary for fiscal years 2002 through 2007” to 
“enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and 
respond to terrorist acts” (Doyle, 2001).xxvi Finally, Section 1015 approves 
appropriations up to $250 million per year for, “state and local grants for the 
development of various integrated information and identification systems,” 
through fiscal year 2007. (Doyle, 2001).xxvii
Not surprisingly, the evidence suggests increased federal-local 
cooperation. While there were 35 formal Joint Terrorism Task Forces before 
the September 11 attacks, each of the FBI’s 56 field offices now has a JTTF. In 
addition, there are another 10 “stand-alone” JTTFs in the FBI’s larger resident 
agencies, plus a large variety of “JTTF annexes” sponsored by other field 
offices in “small to medium sized resident agencies” (Casey, 2004).  Indeed, 
considering the nationwide scope of federal involvement with local law 
enforcement under the rubric of combating terrorism – even in areas with 
neither a history nor a substantial threat of terrorist attack (Dreyfuss, 2002) –
the war on terror represents a previously unprecedented expansion of federal 
oversight and control over the traditionally local governmental sphere of crime 
control.
That such joint task forces can enflame long-standing disputes about the 
scales of justice is best illustrated by one of the places where the debate burned 
brightest--Portland.  Even if expansive federal authority often has been seen as 
more “progressive” politically, Portland’s political culture, for avowedly 
progressive reasons, rejected a strong federal role in policing.
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Local Resistance to the War on Terror: The Portland Case:
The City of Portland devoted local police resources to a Joint Terrorism 
Task Force between 1997 and 2005. The tumultuous history of this partnership 
between local and federal law enforcement agencies provides a particularly 
germane example of how scale can be ideologically mobilized by those with 
both local and federal interests.  It also highlights a number of tensions and 
issues concerning the scale of law enforcement, some of which have 
traditionally been identified with the expansion of federal jurisdiction in the 
past, and some of which are new and particular to the political climate since 
September 11, 2001. 
To understand the debate in Portland, we conducted a content analysis 
of news articles appearing in The Oregonian, the lone metropolitan daily 
newspaper, with a circulation of nearly 350,000 (450,000 on Sunday). This 
analysis serves as the basis for our discussion of the mobilization of discourses 
of scale by local and federal law enforcement agencies, politicians, and interest 
groups.  As a mainstream newspaper governed by contemporary journalistic 
standards of balanced reporting, The Oregonian can be presumed to represent 
the viewpoints of the key actors on either side of this and other prominent 
public debates.  It is thus a good source to use to discern the contours of this 
debate, and the key tropes mobilized by those on either side.
Our analysis covers a period extending from the inception of the 
Portland JTTF, to the controversial vote by City Council to withdraw local 
police officers from the JTTF in April 2005.   The Joint Terrorism Task Force 
was discussed in 117 articles in the eight-year period.  Each news story was 
assigned a score based on the frequency and nature of discourses present.  
Articles that devoted more space to perspectives critical of local involvement 
in the JTTF were classified as being opposed to participation, while articles 
that devoted a greater amount of attention to issues relating to the benefits of 
JTTF membership were classified as being in favor of participation (see table 
1.1).  Overall, a greater number of articles (n=61) appearing in The Oregonian
opposed local participation in the task force.  That said, a significant amount of 
news coverage was favorable to local participation on the task force (n=46).  A 
smaller number of articles (n=10) devoted an equal amount of attention to both 
sides of the debate, earning a neutral score.
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Table 1.1.  Discourses present in media coverage of JTTF participation, 1997-2005
Position of article Discourses Key voices
Opposed to participation 
in JTTF: 61
- Potential abuse of civil 
rights/racism (49)
- Legality; conformity with state 
constitution (35)
- Need for locally elected oversight 
of police (28)
- Potential for police surveillance of 
legitimate political activity (26)
- Not worth expenditure / should 
focus on local  issues (18)
-Participation in federal 
investigations  hinders effective 
community policing (10)
Mayor Tom Potter; Mayor Vera 
Katz; City commissioner Randy 
Leonard; city attorney Jeff 
Rogers; Stanley Cohen, legal 
council for Kariye; Dave 
Fidanque, ACLU spokesperson;  
Bilal Mosque community; Islamic 
Center of Portland; Japanese 
American Citizen’s League
In favor of participation in 
JTTF: 46
..
- Need to protect local security (33)
- Need to protect security at the 
national scale (24)
- Need to combat domestic terrorist 
groups (22)
- Importance of information sharing 
between local/federal agencies (22)
- Portland’s exceptionalism; 
isolation from regional interests 
(14)
- Legality of investigations(13)
- Portland’s scalar position in wider 
war on terror (13)
Mayor Vera Katz; Chief of Police 
Kroeker; Chief of Police Derrick 
Foxworth; Assistant U.S. 
Attorney John Kroger; FBI Agent 
Matthews; FBI Agent Jordan;  
Beaverton Mayor Ron Drake; 
local Portland  business groups
Neutral:  10
Total:  117
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Editorial space devoted to the JTTF in the years leading up to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks was limited.  Oregon FBI chief Kathleen 
McChesney had pushed for the creation of an anti-terror task force in 1997, when 
local law enforcement efforts were largely concerned with threats to local 
infrastructure from domestic activist groups and those accused of “eco-terrorism.” 
This focus was evident in the wording of the initial City Council ordinance, which 
mandated the use of local law enforcement resources to "identify and target for 
prosecution those individuals or groups who are responsible for Right Wing 
and/or Left Wing movements, as well as acts of the anti-abortion movement and 
the Animal Liberation Front/Earth Liberation Front." (Oregonian, December 1, 
2000).  The wording of the ordinance troubled local civil rights advocates, who 
were concerned that the mandate of the JTTF granted too many surveillance 
powers to both local and federal law enforcement agents.  In particular, they cited 
Portland’s troubled history of cases involving misuse of surveillance material by 
local police forces.  A number of high- profile local cases colored subsequent 
discussions of law enforcement powers by local critics.  In one case, an officer of 
the Portland police intelligence unit had leaked a cache of surveillance 
documents. The embarrassing revelation that the leaked documents contained a 
photograph of Portland Mayor Vera Katz at an agricultural labor rally in the 
1960s helped fuel arguments that local police resources could potentially be used 
to monitor legitimate political activity. In a separate case, political activist 
Douglas Squirrel successfully sued the City in 1993, alleging that Portland police 
officers had conducted illegal surveillance of his political activities by dispatching 
two undercover agents to a meeting that Squirrel attended in 1992. Multnomah 
County Circuit Judge Michael Marcus found that the conduct of the Portland 
Police Bureau violated state law because Squirrel had not committed a crime 
during the course of the meeting.  He ruled that "The mere presence of an 
individual, group, organization, corporation, business or partnership at an event or 
activity where criminal behavior is discussed, planned or conducted by others 
shall not be sufficient basis" for recording the behavior of that individual 
(Oregonian, December 2, 2001). 
Thus in the early stages of local participation on the JTTF, critics 
mobilized arguments about the potential for abuse of police power and the 
illegitimate surveillance of non-criminal political activity.  Prior to September 11, 
2001, primarily local actors used these discourses to question the role and 
motivations of local law enforcement emboldened by federal assistance. These 
discourses changed following September 11.  Local resistance to the JTTF 
increasingly focused on using State legal precedent to protect local citizens’ rights 
from the potential overreaching of surveillance by federal agencies.
The Marcus ruling formed the basis for criticisms of the legality of police 
participation on the JTTF in November of 2001, when the FBI planned to conduct 
interviews with 200 local individuals of Middle Eastern descent.   City attorney 
Jeff Rogers argued that the interviews violated a 1981 Oregon statute that 
prohibited law enforcement agents from collecting or maintaining information on 
individuals who were not suspected of criminal activity. City politicians and 
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attorneys framed their opposition to the planned questioning in legal terms, 
arguing that partisan politics had no sway over their mobilization of state law. 
Yet advocates of federal involvement cited Portland’s exceptionalism in 
challenging the planned participation of local law enforcement agents.  Critics of 
Portland’s City Council repeatedly framed the municipal government’s actions as 
unique and uncharacteristic of sentiment in other cities. One U.S. Department of 
Justice spokeswoman stated that "Portland's actions are not representative of what 
we're hearing. Fortunately, we're getting a different response from local police 
around the country." (Oregonian, November 22, 2001). The characterization of 
Portland as alone in its resistance to federal efforts intensified, with critics of the 
city describing it as “The People’s Republic of Portland” and “The Little Beirut.” 
In this way, proponents of the JTTF emphasized the city’s scalar position in the 
national war on terror, and characterized local resistance as a threat to security at 
the local, regional, and national scales.  
Meanwhile, those who opposed the City’s participation in the federal 
investigation increasingly framed the issue in terms of local democratic 
responsibility.  For example, a spokesperson from the Japanese American 
Citizen’s League, Scott Sakamoto, argued that the checks and balances that 
traditionally kept local law enforcement agents under the oversight of 
democratically elected officials did not apply to federal bodies such as the JTTF:
Because Portland police officers are deputized by the FBI, their activities may 
not be regulated by state law and administrative rules that prohibit political 
surveillance. Among those protections are provisions that require files to be 
audited and purged if no criminal activity is involved. In contrast, FBI records are 
permanent and may be shared with other agencies. (Oregonian, September 26, 
2001)
The city’s attorneys successfully blocked participation by local members of 
the JTTF in the federal investigation.  This proved something of a pyrrhic victory, 
however, since the interviews were ultimately allowed to be carried out by federal 
agents without participation from the local police (cf. Thacher, 2005).  
Furthermore, Portland police continued to participate in other investigations and 
remained active on the JTTF. One year later, in 2002, The Oregonian reported 
that the relationship between the FBI and local police had in fact grown even 
stronger, stating that participation in the task force had grown to include 40 local 
law enforcement agents (Oregonian, June 2, 2002). 
A series of high-profile arrests in the Portland area helped to galvanize 
positions on both sides of the issue.  When FBI agents detained Sheik Mohamed 
Kariye at Portland International Airport, local law enforcement agents complained 
that the FBI had cordoned off the area and limited their involvement in the case 
(Oregonian, September 9, 2002).  Kariye was initially detained because trace 
amounts of explosive material were detected on his luggage.  However, when 
tests returned negative, the FBI continued to detain him on charges of social 
security fraud.  This angered the local Muslim community, who felt that federal 
law enforcement agents were unjustly targeting Kariye.  The Islamic Center of 
Portland mosque emerged as a key voice of opposition to Kariye’s detention, and 
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mobilized two main arguments for his release.  The first was the charge that 
federal agencies like the FBI, operating outside of democratically elected 
oversight, were engaging in a form of racial persecution of Muslims and using
archaic legal statutes to detain average citizens without due process.  The second 
discourse appealed to Kariye’s role as a prominent member within the local 
community.  That such a key figure could be detained, critics alleged, illustrated a 
lack of specific cultural knowledge on the part of federal agents unfamiliar with 
local Muslim knowledge and practices.
Friends and family of Mike Hawash echoed these discourses when he was 
charged with assisting the Portland Six in March 2003.  The Portland Six were a 
group of Muslims living in the United States who were charged with attempting 
to enter Afghanistan during the 2001 offensive with the aim of fighting against 
U.S. forces.  Secrecy by federal law enforcement surrounding the arrests of these 
accused sympathizers served to strengthen opposition to potential abuses by 
federally mandated investigation teams.  Moreover, the potential that the arrests 
were premised upon racial profiling exacerbated concerns about the abuse of civil 
liberties.  But proponents of local participation in the “War on Terror” cited these 
arrests as evidence of the critical role of Portland in the national fight against 
terrorism.  For example, one report situated Portland on an “Al Qaeda Trail” that 
linked Osama bin Laden with local Muslim religious leaders (Oregonian, 
September 13, 2002).   The ability of the FBI and other federal agencies to track 
the international movements and relationships of terror suspects was repeatedly 
cited as a necessary complement to local law enforcement, which lacked 
sufficient resources to make connections at wider scales. "Portland isn't immune 
from terrorism," Commissioner Jim Francesconi said on September 19. "We must 
work with the FBI." (Oregonian, September 19, 2002).
Opponents of the Joint Terrorism Task Force failed to assert sufficient 
political pressure as Mayor Katz and other city council members voted 
unanimously to remain involved with the JTTF in 2003 and 2004.  The Mayor 
and Chief of Police Foxworth did yield to public demand for greater official 
oversight of police activity.  Both promised to apply for secret-level FBI security 
clearance so that they could monitor the activities of Portland police officers 
participating in the JTTF.  However, only Foxworth eventually earned the 
appropriate clearance. 
Local elections in 2004 changed the composition of the City Council and 
brought Tom Potter into the Mayor’s office.  These changes caused a shift in 
focus back to an assessment of the role of city police in the JTTF.  In February 
2005, The Oregonian began reporting that Council Member Randy Leonard and 
Mayor Potter were opposing continued city involvement and asking the FBI for 
increased oversight of taskforce activities.  On March 23, it was announced that 
Potter was requesting top-secret-level clearance for himself and Police Chief 
Foxworth to provide more rigorous supervision of local police resources. Portland 
FBI Agent Robert Jordan opposed any civilian involvement on the task force, 
echoing earlier arguments that Portland was alone in its opposition to federal 
oversight of the JTTF. On March 24, he told The Oregonian that the demands by 
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the mayor were "simply not feasible or reasonable… No other mayor in the 
country has been granted the top-secret clearance that Potter wants.” (Oregonian, 
March 24, 2005). As debate intensified, local proponents of participation in the 
JTTF argued that Portland’s exceptionalism would harm regional security and the 
relationship of other neighboring counties with the federal government. In a letter 
to the mayor, Police Chief Foxworth argued that "Nonsupport of the JTTF would 
cause long-term damage to our reputation and credibility within the law 
enforcement community. This will likely weaken our relationships with remaining 
law-enforcement partners and break down lines of communication." (Oregonian, 
April 23, 2005).  An e-mail distributed to local law enforcement agencies in 
Oregon by the Department of Homeland Security threatening to withdraw funding 
for local training partnerships demonstrated that there was some substance to the 
chief’s concerns.  Despite this, the City Council voted on April 29 to withdraw 
support from the Joint Terrorism Task Force and reassign those police officers to 
new roles within the Portland Police Bureau.
In their analysis of the relations between federal and local law 
enforcement agencies, Geller and Morris (1990) outlined some of the primary 
incentives and disincentives for local participation in task forces, many of which 
emerged in the Portland case.  In terms of incentives, Geller and Morris cite the 
access to sophisticated investigative and prosecutorial tools as one draw for local 
community police involvement.  Proponents of Portland’s participation in federal 
investigations regularly expressed the need for local police to retain their top-
secret clearance in order to have access to FBI computers and crime labs where 
critical information was exchanged.  Similarly, budgetary considerations have 
been traditionally cited as powerful motivators for local involvement in federal 
task forces. Proponents of city participation on the JTTF also emphasized the 
need to share information between jurisdictions, and the possibility that local 
police forces could benefit from federal preparedness training.
The Portland case is also illustrative of both traditional and new 
disincentives to local partnership with federal law enforcement agencies.  
Certainly the FBI’s unwillingness to share sensitive information with elected 
politicians and local police caused frustration and suspicion among members of 
the public.  There was also a very strong mistrust of centralized federal authority 
among many Portland citizens, particularly those in the Muslim community. As a 
result, progressives on the left found themselves in the unusual position of 
supporting the need for localized government and oversight of police practices, 
even though the city and the police bureau had a recent history of civil liberties 
violations and abuse of investigative power. Critics of the task force repeatedly 
framed Portland’s participation as a hindrance to local community policing 
efforts, because citizens’ mistrust of the federal mandate created a rift between 
community members and law enforcement agents.  Mayor Potter and the City 
Council mobilized these tropes and committed additional material support to 
community policing efforts once they withdrew support from the JTTF. "I don't 
think whether we stay in or out of the JTTF will determine the safety of Portland 
citizens,” Potter said after the City Council vote, “I think what will determine the 
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safety of Portland citizens is when we work together, when we watch out for each 
and care for each other, that our society is safer." (Oregonian, April 29, 2005) 
Unsurprisingly, opponents of the mayor’s position saw the move by City 
Council as a knee-jerk reaction that did more symbolic damage to national unity 
than material good to the citizens of Oregon.  While mocking members of the 
City government, one commentator chillingly evoked a similar period in this 
country’s history when civil liberties were threatened by far-reaching federal 
surveillance power: "What [this ruling] basically says is that Portland is a very 
politically correct and very naive city that is also very paranoid. I'm not sure that's 
going to surprise anyone, but it might surprise the City Council to know that J. 
Edgar Hoover is dead." (Oregonian, April 28, 2005).
Conclusion: Calibrating the Scales of Justice
J. Edgar Hoover may well be dead, but the tensions he irritated by expanding 
federalized crime control efforts persist.   Even if Portland’s resistance to the 
JTTF was unusual in these terror-obsessed times, the City’s opposition relied 
upon well-worn discourses that simultaneously condemned intrusive centralized 
authority and validated local control of policing.  And this resistance to the 
probing eye of the federal state is hardly unique to Portland; numerous state and 
local governments have expressed disquiet about, and open resistance to, aspects 
of the Patriot Act (Cambanis, 2004).
That such debates rage on shows clearly that the scales of justice can never be 
brought to a restful balance.  No easy resolution is possible because plausible 
arguments exist for both centralizing and devolving political power.  This is true 
in the context of law enforcement, and in numerous other policy arenas. This 
reality enables political activists to argue for centralization in one context and 
devolution in another.  The ideologies of scale are fluid and ever-changing; 
yesterday’s Great Society liberal arguing in favor of strong national oversight of 
civil rights and anti-poverty initiatives is today’s Patriot Act opponent arguing 
against strong national authority to mount national security investigations that 
threaten basic civil liberties. 
Yet even if the ideologies of scale are fluid, they are simultaneously quite 
potent.  Those who support local participation in federal task forces can cite the 
virtues of a centralized authority that can best protect a vulnerable nation through 
its efficient practices.  Their opponents cite the equally-valued virtues of local 
control of law enforcement, the better to assure proper oversight of the police’s 
coercive authority and surveillance powers.  Each of these broad ideological 
positions—favoring centralized or decentralized authority--is considered 
legitimate in American political discourse, in the context of law enforcement and 
other policy areas.  Each can thus be drawn upon in debates about the police 
power, and other powers, of the state.
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In short, geographic scale is a contradictory political object: it is a discursive 
signifier that is both strong and elusive; both ideologically-charged and 
ideologically-promiscuous.  This is not inherently problematic, because there is 
no necessary reason why one should advocate solely for one scale to the complete 
exclusion of others.  It is simply that resting one’s political argument on the 
grounds of scale, however robustly, will likely prove an unstable position.  
Despite the ideological significance often attached to scale, it is a fickle political 
arrow to fire--it may reverse itself in flight as one moves to a different context.
As the Portland case illustrates, debates about the scale of governance can 
become especially impassioned when they come to the issues of crime and terror.  
Political debates about crime and terror are necessarily highly charged, often 
pursued with moral fervor.  As these politics touch upon pre-existing concerns 
about the scale balance of political power, they become even more enflamed.  
Critics of Portland’s decision to withdraw from the JTTF may cite its 
exceptionalism, but we see this story as anything but exceptional.  Rather, it is 
another chapter in an ongoing saga about the politics of the scale of governance.  
Other chapters remain to be written, but the story they tell will always be 
inconclusive, because the scales of justice refuse to be equilibrated. 
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